Which way blows the economic wind?
Anyone with substantial (and no-brainer) energy holdings likely enjoyed an outperforming half-year and Q2 compared with any main index. The scribe is sort of content to report that the holdings he manages are up 7% year to date and over 4% in the quarter (the S&P500 is down (1.4)% and up 1.2% over the same periods). "Sort of content" because: this result was less skill than, well, going with the obvious; and measuring performance over 6 months is arbitrary and hardly informative.
Nonetheless, next quarter and the full year may prove more awkward terrain: the macro-economic outlook is slowly but surely deteriorating (see the 5 point matrix below). Even energy prices cannot remain robust indefinitely within a weakening economy (unless the demand curve really has shifted outwards, and the jury will be out on that for awhile yet):

Possibly the most significant message of this matrix is that the flattening US yield curve (the June 10 year note minus 3 month Treasury bill yield is now down to 0.9 points) has begun to signal a small chance - around 8% - of a recession one year out. This is derived below from the reliable Estrella-Mishkin recession probability model.

Additionally, equities are modestly but bearishly weaker versus 6 months ago; and the ISM Purchasing Managers Index continues its decline towards the key "50" mark. A surprise drop to less than that with July 1's release (08h30 EST) would be a huge red flag (consensus is 51.5).
On the other hand, risk aversion - as measured by a widening spread between AAA rated bonds and the 10 year Treasury note - has not increased: the spread narrowed over the last 6 months and, it seems, indicates continuing risk appetite for non-sovereign paper.
Another positive is the last reading of the excellent Philadelphia Fed "Anxious Index". This shows professional economists confident of decent GDP growth 2 quarters forward. The intuitive reaction of anti-economists that this ought to be a contra-indicator does not, on the index's historical record, yet bear scrutiny.
So, bar a shock, no tipping point looks probable in the second half of 2005 although, clearly, the possibility should be kept in mind. But the US economy does have vulnerabilities: employment, sales, inventories and order data were all weaker in May (see the Chicago Fed National Activity Index for detail) and may be harbingers of the slippery slope. An unexpected piece/trend of bad data - a personal favourite being rising inflation, the chance of which is being almost entirely ignored by financial markets - could hasten any descent.
NB: The triggers shown in the matrix are consistent with calibrations that have marked the conditions for every US recession since 1962.





To no one's surprise (with the exception of Her Majesty's Government and the unlamented responsible Secretary of State, Ms P Hewitt) MG Rover last month finally succumbed to the weight of nose-diving sales, lack of new product and no means of raising further cash.
