
Banking in the UK, together with (ironically)
pharma and tobacco, are consistently the top 3 most profitable sectors over most time horizons. But this year, despite earning forecasts generally holding steady, banks (on both sides of the Atlantic as it happens) have suffered a price
derating in a rising interest rate environment.
This turn has brought a premier bank like
RBS, for example, to the point where it forward yields 5.4% and sells on a earning multiple of less than 10 dropping to under 8 on forecasts. And yet it is still willing to be party to a deal paying 20 times forward earnings for the distinctly ordinary
ABN Amro franchise. It is implicitly telling shareholders it can simultaneously grow and cut its bit of the purchase beyond the
profitability point despite the impressively high price.
RBS performed this feat with its Nat West purchase in early 2000. But this time there is no obvious domestic overlap where nearly 20,000 jobs can be shed. Its targets look wishful; and without
LaSalle as part of the deal the strategic benefits do not seem compelling.
Its consortium partners, largely out of focus in the UK press, appear better placed.
Fortis, especially, is pursuing a company transforming deal and wants the core Dutch network where it might be able to do a Nat West. And
Santander is after
ABN Amro’s Brazilian ops where probably it would do better than
Barclays given its existing franchise there. In fact, it is curious, given their relative strengths in Brazil, that
Barclays has not tried a divide and rule tactic to beak the opposition by conceding a sale and dealing directly with the Spanish. Or maybe it has/is.
Meanwhile, a rival bid is supposedly in the offing from
Citigroup,
Banco Bilbao and
ING* - a team bearing an uncanny resemblance to the
RBS consortium. Oh, to be an
ABN Amro equity holder.
In contrast, institutional cross holders in the various bidders must be somewhat concerned. Possibly all the more so with the potential for further rate rises sparked, perhaps, by inflation data appearing over the next couple of days with the US numbers. That would raise financing costs, unbalance the deal’s value assumptions and make banking operations less straightforward and profitable.
Doomsdayish? Maybe. But all in, it is not looking a bad toss to lose for
RBS shareholders.